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El! CmIS IN U. S. DEFENSE
By Klaus Knorr

* * & & * * * * * * * * *

E

bel lore the sputniks began .to whiz around the earth, the Ame6~8n
people had good cause to ask whether their ddellse &Fortwm sdcient
for reasbnable safety. Year after year, the Russiank had been surprising the
West wi& the speed at which they improved their military teohnology. The
Soviet h i o n developed fission and fusion bombs, +andnmo&m fighters and
bombing planes, more rapidly than had been anticipated. In 1957, the RUSsuddenly moved ahead of the United*States in the' successful testihg of
ballistic &iles and, of course, ia the fielding of ear&'-Wa.
These were
not isolited scientifio and techno10gic:al dtchi&m& The R-ans
are at
least as advanced qs the United staieS in the oonstructiaa of ayhtrons and
electronic computers, and they lead in &dwelomentt .of :@aptjet airliners.
While they seem to lag far behind in durable consumers' goods,.they appear to
ba doing exceedingly well with projects onlwhick they. concentrata
Until the sputniks, Washington had responded to Soviet teChnologica1 ad.oimcea by re855urjng the .colmtry that, as before, the United States held a
decisive*militaryedge over the ,Q$I$.. Daring the summer of 1957, at the very
time when thg Govewemt had-leaned. of tlre swccessful testing of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) in Soviet Russia, the Department of
Zkfense launched a frantic e f f o k b &uce the rate of military spending and
to pare the manpower of the Armed Services. This ruthless exercise in retrenchment was avowedly undertaken f~ m d c masons. Insistent demands
l
to permit a cut in Federal taxes, a camfor reduoing the ~ e d e r i budget
paign to diminish inflationary pressures, and the fi* reluctance to permit
Federal expenditures even temporarily to pierce thediktutory ceiling of $275
billion on the national debt-all these provided the motive power behind the
economy drive. When Moscow announced the wccesfd laundhg of an
ICBM, our leaders observed that it would take the Rmeians several years before the experimental design would be mass-produced as an operational
weapon. It occurred to few commentators, at &st, to ask the obvious question: If the Russians have beaten us in the race to produce an experimental
model, are they not also likely to beat us in the production of operational
ICBM's?
This complacent mood, which allowed repeated danger signals to be played
down, was caught poignantly in a New Yorker cartoon showing a middle-aged,
well-to-do lady remarking to her spouse: "Well, this has been a good week
for everybody. The Russians got the ICBM and we got the Edsel." In view
VEN

-

,

of,gathering widen= of Soviet anrm p&iency, it .should not ham repired
the sputniks to disturb this mood. But it did take the earth satellite to shatter
8. The sputniks lcould not ,hdenied bi ignored. They shocked 'thek'berican
public, and through it, the nation's leadership which, as before; was at first
disposed to counter any alarmist sestihenb with soothing r e a s s w w e At
la&, in the middle of November, Washington admittad officially that the
United States was lagging two or &.reyears behind the Soviet Union in the
missiles fieldk
S h t i n g tbe first eAh
its orbit was more than a spleddid
scientific and technical achievement. What dismayed many Western e~perEs
was not so much that the Russians were first than that the weight of the
Russian moons'.',,^^ m y times greatmSand th& orbit farther out in
space, ihan thoseJd~-be
pjecaed Anmic81f satdlite. Them facts have several
meanings. The sputniks c o n h e d that the USSR had developed rocket eng b i of
~ ~
p~werfulthruet, and Wer el&~ronicg&hce system, &an
had thq#~&?ait&,States-a~lid~
thk is of inmdiak impartance in long-range
-missiaetdevdo-t;
Mote important, they dispelled a persistent illasion about
\ R ~ ~ w ~ r i ~ in
r iOt ~yi .e nand
~ een@jnm&g, and i o r d . t h e West to die
oerd an'absokte image bf Soviet capabilitya Along with other evidence, the
SO&^ earth satdlites; discredit the belief thdt the vast manpower resouM,es
of the C~mmuniatworld con be balanced by the technologid superiority of
%

I

w&di&ihto

the W d .

.Even though the overall Russian perfomhce in all scientific fields, d-

tan and civilian, ie still appreciably behind the American, the gap is closing

and tbe Soviet Union.b spring no e.fEort to dose it in lureas important to
dlitary paIt is on the traditi01m1 belitf in Soviet backwar&ess h a t
m u ~ hof the defense planning in the West has been based, and that many
cpountrb~plaed their hope in the ahilty of the United States to protect the
free-.natiins. The apparent Soviet - mpttlr~$.
:of the technological initiative
mmwd to reveal-to eoaie newt.td.4~well rs..&ed .nations that their security
was f-dd
on W a n .
-8
the &ties generated in the ;United States by the Soviet moons are
fat:from groanthis readive s n 4 is, unfortunately, focusing on h e r i can -Mi
p&qgces~
to the vktua1 excluaioe of 0th- components of om
milimy pb&u1:b hdeed, them is a grave do-r that-increasedexpendims
on missiles will be off* in s ~ m e p w tat 1'by-further reductioa of tbis
c(~~1trf~'s
&i&ty:
myduct limitd ware. What je urgently needed at this
tinbe isnot a hawtic imitative respoase on the part of the United States, but a
searching reappraisal of the entire d e f w effort. Five basic questionsinter-related but s e p m & b l 4 d dh d focua to, this reappraisd:
*-What is tbe world military situation which the United States must beet
,
by its own military stature?
What kind of d i t a r y posture, and what 'kindof grand.strategy,
are
re..
..
cfuir:d. by this situation? .
:
What a n the mats of an adequate defense &0& and how much of a burden-can the American economy stand?
Is the American defense elfort handicapped-not only*by an bsufEciacy
I

.

of resources but also by the inefficiency with which the allocated resources are
actually employed?
Finally, how much priority does' the American public want to give the
provisions for national security?
In taking up these questions, the following discussion is necessarily selective. It focuses on what are perceived to be some of the major issues confronting the American defense effort, and it ignores such important problems as
the NATO relationship, international arms control, and the American position
in waging the political, economic and diplomatic struanle known as the
Cold War-

Soviet Hostility: The starting point of any analysis of the world military
situation is the implacable hostility of the Soviet Union to the liberal, democratic West. The Russian rulers continue to afhrm their belief that the Communist system will eventually engulf the world, that this expansion is part of
an inexorable historical process, and that it is their mission to abet and exploit
the forces of revolution. This does not mean necessarily that they expect to
conquer in war. Thus far, the record of Soviet Russia has been mostly one of
military caution. The Kremlin may hope that the military power at its command will neutralize that of the West,and prefer to expand the sway of Communist rule piecemeal and chiefly through diplomacy, propaganda, subversion
and-in
the economically underdeveloped world especially-through economia help and the attraction of the Soviet model for rapid industrialization.
The West, however, has no assurance that the USSR will stick to "peaceful" but highly competitive coexistence. The Soviet record also shows that
Moscow is far from averse to using military force, or the threat of military
action, whenever doing so seems to involve little risk to its own security.
During the Suez crisis of 1956; again in response to the American policy of
sending atomic weapons to the NATO countries; and, finally, as part of
Moscow's stand in favor of Syrian "independence" in the fall of 1957, the
USSR uttered sharp threats of atomic and rocket retaliation. It is precisely in
order to deny the Soviet bloc the opportunity for military blackmail and con\
quest that the West must build up sufficient counter-force.
We need not assume that Soviet hostility and imperialism are forever
inevitable. Like any other society, Soviet Russia is subject to change. But
dependable change in Soviet behavior will be slow in coming, and short-run
changes must be discounted. Mere protestations of peaceful intentions are
likely to express no more than a tactical maneuver. Mere changes in the personalities of the leaders will mean little as long as the present system remains
essentially intact. Nor can much store be set on any sudden crisis of leadership, for internal weakness may lead to a sharpening rather than an abatement
of external aggressiveness. Dependable change in Soviet foreign policy can
result only from profound changes in Soviet institutions ind attitudes, and
such changes take time to mature. Even if we perceive present trends indicat-

k g such basic change, we must assume for the time being that these trends
are ten-,
subject to abrupt reversal, and of uncertain consumnation. Much
as we hope for such changes, we mnst assume, to be on the safe side in so

momentous a matter, that intense hostility to the West is still central to Soviet
motivations and may continue to be for a long time.
From the military point of view, the United States and the Soviet Union
dwarf all other countria in military power. At present, only the United States
can check the thermonuclear air power of the USSR. Nor does any country
dong the long periphsry of the Sin&*
bloc possess conventional forces
Soviet-mounted offermsive. If the
strong enough to resist for long a d-sd
Soviet Union, whether acting directly or through proxy, is to be stopped from
conquering outlyiq areas by local aggression, the non-Comunist world
must o r g h ,sufficient counter-force; and it has become increasingly clear
that only the United States can be effective as the organizer and has resources
sizable enough for operating militarily over far distances,
Soviet Strength: If the United States needs military power to protect its
own territories as well as forestall a development condemning it to live ever
more precariously in a shrinking .island within a spreading Communist world,
its military effort must obviously be related to Soviet military capabilites (p&
marily Busaia's but secondarily, and over time increasingly, those of the entire
Sino-Soviet bloc) for attacking, or threatening to attack, the United States
and other eritical areas in the non-Communist world. What kinds of forces are
required, and how powerful should these forces be? Sinm, in both respects,
American needs are governed largely by the structure and scale of the Soviet
military effort, it is important to notice .the wealth of resourcemanpower;
economic, scientific and administrativewhich the Soviet Union is now
devoting to the buildup of its military power and is likely to devote to' it in
the future.
Indisputably, the ~bvietleader6 give a hi& and firm priority to military
effort, and the totahrian system of gove-ent
puts them in a position to
impose this priority on Soviet society. Their sumssive plans for industriahation, showing a major emphasis on &ivy industry, have always been directed
in large part to providing the industrial underpinning for military strength.
Although Russia's Gross National Product is at present only somewhat over a
third of the h t k n GNP, the Soviet Union is believed to spend a larger proportion of it-pexhaps half again as l a r g m n defense than does the United
Statea. While the Soviet defense budget may be less in absolute amount than
the American, Buseia gets a great deal more military worth out of &ch
defense dollar than the United States- She spends far less on pay, subsistence
and safety of military personnel; at the expense of consumer goods industries,
she empbJS her most productive resources-the best workers, managers and
scientists, and the best equipped factories-in the defense sector of the economy; a d she gives that sector overriding priority in the dimibutioa of m r c e
materiels. Hence, with a far smaller national income, the real resources
d16aed to defense by the USSR may fall little short of the American docation.
In 1957, the GNP of the USSR was growing at an estimated rate of about
7 per cent a year, compared with somewhat leas than 4 per cent in the United

Stataa It is probable that the Soviet rate of economic growth will slow down
soamhat in the future, as it has-in recent years, and it is possible that the
Kremlin will find it politically e e t to do appreciably more for the Soviet
consumer than it has done in the pest The resulting pressures would reduce
the ease with which further resources cnn be relased for use in the*ntilitary
s e ~ t ~ r . the 0 t h hand, U B the~ soviet
~
rate of economic growth slows
dowa sdwtantiaIly and soon, a d u a h CO-m
can make their demands
a great deel mom &6ctive politicany tlrm they hawe so far, the USSR may
divert a
imm~sing
v o b e of r e m u m to the military sector, and
&as inth p m e exerted on the United S t a b and its allies. As
Long as hsia'd sate of economic growth remains higher &an the American,
sbe can maialia roughly the pr-t
proportions in the allocation of income
to d e b , , i m w m and consumption.arid t h s eqand milaarg expendib r a w&
at tbe s ~ m a
time diverting more to her conswlzers.
-Shoe the militrace may be to the techndogicaIly swift, it is worth
thm factors which may enable the Sodet Union to d id this area
a

Ccmmnunist leaders are fully aware that wexre living in e scientific age. They are firmly dedicated to exploring the endlessiscieintific &ontier,
md b y are spinkg oo eBort to multiply the numbers of their scienfists and
aml t~ improve their training. There Is an impressive array of mid 'to~~phichthis Soviet effort has in recent y a m wrpassed that
&.theU&
Stab .
%C&O
dertljonmnmm
the wisdom of the Nszo Yorker-whide
Aneerieam brsios .ad talent an,direrted hrgelp to the developnzent and merc h m q .of- y
and the a t i r e m g e of camp' goods and servkm,
the R d m put. the. beat af their aompralile momcegi to work on ICBM's,
sputniks and the basic sciences that feed technological advance. With the balm
ry p m in the lomg run rathg in large part on the balame of
$ecbbiogical capacity, this Soviet emphasis on science and
ring :mi9 again entail increasing bilitary pressure on the West
lRough ttaebjakn&@
base of the United § t a b still exceeds the Russian,
a ~ ~ ; m + m t ibase
j k .is becoming weaker than theirs.
Pinely, :in.tbe &cbnt use of r a r c e s allocated to the military sleetor,
Ssvia
emjoys the advantage aoctamg t~ the potential aggr&r
(prodded it id c h r to her, ar, it is tm us, && she in ,fact ocmpies that role and the
~ i d l . S t a t e?does
s
not). Since cel(zuhted aggression is aaoaeptable in the
~11:M
Sbtes,'the Russians are able to explait the benefit of their initiative
and imfonr, on the United States the far less ~fficientcourse of preparing for
a .wider ranbe of eventualities. Whether they will actually fre able td do so
i3epends, of mum, on many contingencies, including the conntsr mcamres
of ahs Wd*

+

WWT . o k ~ l mTechnologioally, .the world military situation is
dominated by themonuclern bombs and the various means for their delivery.
This development Bas crudidly changed the military problem from what it
was before and during the two world wars. The advent of these weapons
systems has several important implicatims:

There is the new and awesome dimension of destructiveness: It takes
only a single hydrogen bomb in the lower megaton range to equal the total
destructive power of all bombs dropped on all belligerents during World War
II. Such a bomb releases about a thousand times more destructive power than
the one dropped on Hiroshima.
For purposes of all-out nuclear war, these new weapons systems have
given the offensive a tremendous advantage over defense. At present, any
known means of defense against nuclear-bomb carriers promise so low a rate
of attrition that the aggressor can easily offset them by somewhat increasing
his offensive capability. Better and reasonably cheap means of defense may
be developed in the future but are not now in sight. While prospective losses
to life and property could be cut by a considerable margin through dispersal and, especially, the hardening of targets by means of shelters, feasible
measures along these lines cannot avert catastrophic destruction through heat,
blast and radiation.
The speed and range of modern bomb carriers have vastly reduced the
protective functions of time and space. The decieive blows in total war will fall
within a matter of days or weeks. Defense through deterrence, therefore, must
rest entirely on mobilized forces ready for instant retaliation.
Finally, scientific and technological development in the weapons field is
now taking place with a speed unequalled heretofore. This makes the military
sector more voracious of highly skilled personnel and other scarce resources
essential to research and development. It speeds up the rate at which new arms
become obsolescent, thus increasing the military demand for industrial resources in general. And it also makes military planning more dScult and
costly than in the past. In the first place, such planning must now provide
. adequate defenses at different points in t i m e w i t h the weapons of 1958
probably no longer efficient in 1961, with those projected for 1961 possibly
no longer efficient by 1964 and with a lead-time of several years before new
weapons move from the drawing board or laboratory into serial production
and operational use. In the second place, the competitive technological
scramble has increased the factor of uncertainty. The weapons which a
country plans to have available a few years hence must not only be better than
the ones now in use; they must also be better, equal to, or an effective counter
to the anas which a prospective enemy may have available at that future time.
While it is difficult enough an intelligence task to ascertain and evaluate the
weapons now in the hands of prospective opponents, it is obviously harder to
speculate on the quantity of enemy weapons and their performance in the
future.
Types d War: In addition to uncertainty in arms technology, there is the
further, related uncertainty about the types of warfare likely to occur in the
future. There is general agreement that a massive and prolonged war of
attrition fought with "conventional" weapons is highly improbable today;
this kind of war implies war objectives of so high a priority (such as invasion
and occupation) that the belligerents, if pressed hard by their opponenis,
could not be expected to forego the use of more effective weapons in their
arsenals. The unlikelihood of all-out thermonuclear war depends chiefly on
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not only :an-iniECviU
railld+6to o ~ f 6s bdmtry has a c h s t d n g
bat h - o n r s d d k 3 .
dm& .give stxiaim a -&astmIige~%&er&;- thu!
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in the past, in keeping madmen from the controls.) NevmtMesq therird4t~b
dsnC;er of t b m n m k war breaking -8 .inadvertently. Tfxm,+. a 4 t d t d
war -7 gxaduaU~degenm~into a total ahtest; bt'ia nrrtidm&iay lprmipihts an d a u t attack fbr ftar thgt its opponent i s about to do so ;- or, & a
time of grave crisis, a false &tm may set off thb retaliatory meshbnism.
The+aapsoity to p e e the racXidental outbreak of tatal war r* in each
d o h .on strength of motivation, which may be supplied by the fear of being
itself subjected -to UaaCaeptabIe devastation; on the vulnerability of its mums
for rediatiun, for d& HI &ect the fear of absorbing the first blow; on
*btx~t.tive
Competence, w, efktive twrang-ts
tot.&Q
dta=y
~dscisions;and on rsehnologicd cOmpetence,e.g., the abiiity to sift false fnw
I;

,Bbe &rms,.
The mest i€Skp15p
~ ue psed
~ by tBe
s possibility of limbed wars&a w q froin g u d a d* aad minorpoliae actions'fmght

omic wespna, to fairly h g e and ptoIon& wars wkgd with
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md/a pre-miclear arms, bat st~pping;short of the strategic bombing
of:* tbrmoandezu powers the-1Clearly, s n c h ~ on
~ the
e ~ use of
weipms cam b-cffeotiveonly sr long as war aims are limited; for instme,
u - l q es wak aims:do not encompass the daisive defeat-.and occupation
-d~~&ts
side* Bqmnd this p r o p i o n , the problem of. limit& war .hss
g k i ~ to lively ocmtrovers). Aecmding to one school of thought, any&hg
name thrn a-brief and smrdl encounter in a peripheral area of wnftibt
b &kelp.to and up H tot81 war. No do&, it is masonable to assumthat
tbe larger and more p r d m g d the limited war, the greater h g e r - , d
total war. Yet the magnitude of the risk w d d seem to be p r i m e h
.fanoti- of. the niutmal b d ~ c eof terror. If cech paw-'6~ ~ ~ ~
.fagm wzmmpd11e loin total war, the. limits are M y to stick. There
h crlso a soh001 of thought amording to which limited wars fought with tacticil
atomic .waapoas ate likely to progress to the udimited &age because of
niml Wadh in setting and im&
tihe limits Again, the presence of the
risk mmt be conceded. But it a h mma that the danger is in inverse proporti- t6 the f a of botln2sides06 becoming invdved in mliznid b s t i l i t i e a c ~In
either. event, .the.inherent rkk of an a c c i h k l 'breach,a£the limits o ~ g i n g ~
a%-
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rset to a conflict depends chiefly OQ the &umsption with which the major
.belligerents control their beha+r and cammunioate this r d - - t .to. their
. .
opponents.
- . .' -: Even this very summary discuseion mve& thst,in many
snt mili~aryeitoagun Men:@
radically from what nations
.periods The ovanvhekning imptewidn is that we are face to,-facswith Uncertainty. There is techn010pjd m&ty;
there is uncertainty h t the
shape of f-re was, and about the limits that om be imposed an them; there
i a uncertainty about how nations will react ta the opportunity praientd by
a suddee, tbaugh temporary, teehnolo#cal ~upriority,or, on the otber b
d
,
to the danger pewnted by a sudden, even though t~mpo~ary,
~techno10~
hferiority; and there i s uncertainty about how nations will react to nndear
&eats to themselves or to -their allies. &questionably, the military
faees a task of exacting cli3ic*
as well ae frightful consequence.
,
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2. The Americn Response

Amedcan A~t~m-ey: The main trend in American defense planning
1945 has been a progressive cutback, interrupted only dGing tb%
Korean War,in the country's conventional^' (Lea, pre-atomic) forces and a
growing concentration on strategic airpower. This policy was defended on the
grounds (1)that the new nuclear weapons reduced the need for sheer masaes
of military manpower--a component of strength in which the West was considered unable to match the Soviet bloc, and (2) that economic reamns
demanded selective concentration on the essential elements of d t m y
sib?

-&*

The policy, and the military doctrine in which it is rooted, looked persuasive as long as this country possessed o monopoly or vast superiority in
nuclear bombs. Even during this period of U.S. technological and military
ascendancy, however, it wae doubtful whether ofEcia1 doctrine and policy
made sdlicient allowance for limited-war situations in which it would have
beea morally diilicult and politidy unwise to rely on nucletir arms. These
and other doubts became far more pronounced as the decisive American
.superiority in arms technology faded.
By 1957, the United States was reforming a considerable proportion of its
surface forces to fight limited nuclear war, but this shift did not suspend the
.
trend toward clmmdmg military manpower. In order to keep defense
expenditures from rising above the $38 billion-a-year limit, Defense Secretary
Charles E Wilson ordered a reduction of 100,000 men by the end of the
current fiscal year and referred to further plans for reducing the total strength
of ths armed forces to 2.5 million men by July 1959. The cuts fell largely on
. the U.S. Army. And, while Army and Navy units were being converted to
atomic war, it was inevitable that American forced for conventional warfare
ahrank persistently,. In the Navy, the last battleship was put in mothballs, and
the Sixth Fleet, though possessing arespectable nuclear punch, had few planes
and few men for engaging in conventional combat. At the &me time, two
a

.

infantry divisions were to be inactivated by the Aimy and one of its armored
divisions cut to a combat command, to leave a total of 15 divisions by the

fall of 1957.
Tbermonuelear Standoff: Whether this cutback in conventional strength,
and the establishment of a small capability for fighting limited nuclear wars,
give the United States a sufficient choice of military responses was bound to
become a major question once the Russians were believed to be able, or nearly
able, to threaten the United States with thermonuclear devastation.
Whether a thermonuclear stand-off has now been reached may remain controversial. Modern weapons systems are so complex, future war conditions so
uncertain, and intangible factors such as morale so unpredictable that it is
most difficult to measure the present balance of thermonuclear airpower with
any degree of precision. In all probability, United States airpower is today
still superior to the Russian; and, despite Soviet advances in missiles, this
condition may last another few years. But this relatively small and probably
diminishing margin is not a consequential factor in the effective b a l a n c e
and not just because the Kremlin is generally conceded the advantage of
striking the first blow and thus the chance of destroying part of this country's
ability to retaliate. The decisive point is that, exact equality of power or not,
the USSR has now or will soon have the capability of crippling the United
States, inflicting tens of millions of civilian casualties and destroying or paralyzing the bulk and heart of its economy. By the same token, if missile superiority will give the USSR a considerable edge over the retaliatory power of the
United States within two or three years, this is not a matter of major consequence as long as this country retains the capacity, even after enduring a surprise attack, to cause unacceptable damage to the Russians.
On either assumption, however, the United States must now review its
grand strategy for defense, for it can no longer rest on a decisive superiority
in thermonuclear airpower. In the new circumstances, limited war may well
be the most likely form of future warfare. If a new strategy is called for, it
will take several years before a revised policy is formulated and then translated into the hardware and trained personnel of a readapted defense establishment. In fact, the question of a grand strategy for the defense of the West
must be considered an open one. No one choice is obviously right, and this
very dilemma of uncertainty must, to a considerable extent, determine the
American response.
Unquestionably, the United States must keep its strategic air arm capable
of threatening the Soviet Union with unacceptable losses and thereby deterring the Kremlin from risking unlimited war. In view of recent Soviet progress, this alone is no mean undertaking. Success w i l l not be guaranteed by
clinging to the image of one's own scientific and technical leadership. The
United States will have to speed up the development of its offensive delivery
system and do much more than has thus far been necessary to protect the
Strategic Air Command from a surprise attack. At the same time, it might be
a gross error for the United States to put an overwhelming emphasis on overcoming the Russian missile lead or to gamble on the single attempt to recover
decisive superiority over Soviet Russia in thermonuclear striking power. The
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question now is: How safe is it for this country to rely so largely on this single
military instrument for protecting the various U.S. interests that may be at
stake in a great variety of military and political circumstances?
Massive Retaliation: According to the doctrine of massive retaliation
announced by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in January 19% the
United States was then ready to threaten the use of its nuclear airpower whenever Communist local agg_r-=ion could not be thrown back by-$he forces of
the attacked country (reinforced possibly by small contingents from the rest of
the free world). So far as this policy contemplated the possible strategic bombing of the Soviet Union, it rested on the decisive American superiority over
the USSR in thermonuclear airpower. But as the Russians approach -the
United States in this power, this policy becomes more dangerous and poseibly
ineffective. It becomes more dangerous because the chances of unlimited war
coming about inadvertently will inevitably increase with the number of times
the United States is willing to move to the brink of all-out conflict. It becomes
powibly ineffective because, facing the prospect of severe mutilation by the
Soviet Air Force, the United States will become reluctant to risk its popula.
tion and industrial centers in the face of minor aggressions, a change of attitude which would hardly surprise or escape the Kremlin.
Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union may well feel tempted to create
and exploit limited-war situations to a greater extent than in the past-unless
the non-Communist countries find a means for deterring local wars other
than by a threat of U.S. action which, while inflicting disastrous punishment
on the aggressor, accepts roughly the same punishment for the United States
itself. Secretary Dulles addressed himself to this problem in October 1957,
in an article entitled "Challenge and Response in United' States Policy"' in
Forekn Aflairs. He seemed to propose that, while in the past the threat of
massive retaliation was needed to deter Soviet conventional aggression, in the
future this deterrence will result from the West's new capacity in tactical
nuclear weapons. However, Soviet Russia will hardly content herself with
strategic airpower and conventional forces. She has already begun to equip
herself for tactical nuclear war; and, though she may at present lag behind
the United States in the development of a broad range of tactical nuclear
weapons, it is surely an illusion to believe that she may not catch up in
substantial measure.
In that event, the United States cannot be sure of its ability to use tactical
nuclear afms to deter local aggression or stop it in its tracks should it occur.
Nor can it be sure, in that event, that local engagements can be kept small and
short, unless the local balance of tactical nuclear power favors the defenders.
As has been the case with conventional forces for some time, this leaves open
the question of whether the West is able to muster sufbcient counter-force.
For the United States, this means, among other things, whether it will have
enough mobile forces in readiness to support local forces in any area whose
defense is critical from the U.S. viewpoint.
As it becomes widely realized that the USSR has not only acquired the
+ility to bring thermonuclear devastation to the American homeland b-ut is
&Q
maintaining large forms for both limited nuclear war and conventional
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the comparative advantage lies for the United States hinges on a variety of
conditions that are hard to predict. Much depends, for instance, on the actual
limits observed in a tactical nuclear conflict. The United States might face an
intractable problem of supply should the Russians be free to attack American
supply lines on land and sea. To give another example, the United States
might suffer serious political losses abroad if it were to counter conventional
aggression, especially in peripheral aras, by a nuclear riposte.' Furthermore,
since the limits on conventional war are far easier to define (and hence to
enforce) than the limits on tactical nuclear operations, conventional engagements are less likely to end up inadvertently in unlimited hostilities. This may
well be a crucial consideration.
Whatever the level of limited war preferred by the United States, the need to
impose this preference on a prospective enemy raises further problems of great
complexity. Of course, no need for enforcement would arise if both the United
State and the USSR have a strong interest in limiting warfare to the same
level-a condition which is likely to prevail (at least for some time) as far as
progression to total war is concerned. Yet suppose the interests of the two
powers diverge: If tactical nuclear war is its preferred level, the United States
must wield a sdlicient deterrent on the strategic nuclear level to keep the
adversary from raising the ante to unlimited war should he face defeat on
the level preferred by the United States. On the other hand, if conventional
war were the level preferred by this country, any enemy option for the tactical
atomic level would have to be denied either by an American ability to cause
the enemy more unacceptable losses on the higher level, or-going one step
further-by throwing in the threat of unlimited war. To use the latter enforcer
would be much cheaper in terms of defense outlays but the risk of increasing
the likelihood of all-out war would have to be set against this saving.
The A l l i ~ The
: entire ~roblemis somewhat different for the countries in
Western Europe and elsewhere along the periphery of the SinoSoviet bloc,
for they are potential theaters of hostilities in the event of limited war. Few,
ifany, of them can hope by themselves to stop Soviet military aggression on
any level. If they cannot expect help from outside, their best strategy, if they
do not prefer surrender, is to rely on strategic nu+r power-provided they
can supply themselves with the necessary weapons system, protect it from
elimination by surprise attack, and hence threaten the aggressor with enough
destruction to make local aggression unprofitable.
Only the countries allied with the United States have a wider range of
choices. They need not, of course, maintain a strategic nuclear deterrent
of their own as long as the American deterrent is sure t o ' be used for
their protection-a
condition that may not always prevail as a matter of
wurse. Assuming that it does prevail, they might not, at first sight, prefer
preparations for tactical nuclear war. For if aggression is not forestalled, and
they are likely to become the theater of operations, they may expect an unacceptable degree of devastation. Based on this e-tion,
they might refer
either the threat of massive retaliation by the United States against the Soviet
Union in tbe event of Soviet aggression against their own territories-the
chance that New York and Detroit are obliterated rather than Paris and &sen

i-or a level of limited warfa&, e.g., conventional hostilities, likely to be least
harmful to themselves. Eercising the first option would allow such countries
to slight their own defense effort, and spare them a high degree of devasta,
tion; however, should the American threat fail to deter the C o ~ u n i s t s they
would also have to accept the prospect of conquest by the Soviets.
United States is to fa1 in
A further grand strategy open to allies of
with this country if it chooses to establish a solid capability for waging limited nuclear war-and this despite the prospect of crippling destruction should
such a war actually be fought on their own territories. The purpose of such
a choice would be not to wage such a war but to deter it (as well as any serious aggression on the lower level) by maintaining a capacity clearly superior
in all critical areas to Soviet means for waging limited conflicts. The drawback of this strategy is a large outlay of resources by the United States i d
its allies.
Our allies' choice depends in large part on American policy and hence can,
to some extent, be influenced by the United States. Conversely, whatever atrategy these countries chooseand the choice may vary for different countries,
and for each country over time-it cannot help but complicate the task of
American defense planning, for the United States can hardly ignore the preferences of its chief allies.
Two conclusions stand out in this matter of searching for a sound defense
policy :
1. American planning has almost certainly gone too far in cutting ready
surface forces, particularly in the Army, for deterring and fighting limited
war. In addition to strong pressures for a lower defense budget, this neglej
resulted from a time lag in recognizing and adjusting to the U.S. loss of unchaIIenged supremacy in thermonuclear airpower.
2. Laying down a sound strategy for defense in this world of rapid change
is a task of inordinate dSculty. The crucial problem is uncertainty in so
many respects. This would present no trouble if the United States were able
to afford unlimited resources for defense and hence could prepare itself for all
contingencies. Yet the need to select and discriminate cannot be avoided; and
there can be' little confidence that any simple strategy adopted will guarantee
the security of this country. Whatever direction is chosen for the effort of the
United States, there will be an inescapable chance that it is riding for a faU
Air defemse?: The ability to fight abroad is by no means the only capability puzzling American planners. In some degree, home defenses against
thermonuclear air attack must supplement the maintenance of offensive forces.
The United States has made considerable efforts to improve its active air
defense, with the protection of SAC bases receiving a high priority; but
&emely little has been done in civil defense, passive defense (dispersal and
hardening of civili'an targets), and in preparing the country for recovery from
h r g e d e d m c t i o n . * Even though an unlimited thermonuclear .assault on
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Any. high degree of passive defense, thro;lgh-the dispersal or-hardening
of civilian targets, is not only extremely costly but would also require intoler-:
able changes in the peacetime life of the
In view of the .technical superiority of offensive airpower over all known.
defenses, it is relatively easy and cheap for a prospective enemy to comter
costly defensive measures by a marginal increase in his offensive capabilityi:
Under these circumstances, there is a good deal to be said for allocating
additional resources, if still needed, to the American capacity for r e t a l i a t i o ~
present an$ future-and thereby deter any
aggressor from launch-.
ing a&?&out attack.
. .
This jk&cat&n for t&epresent policy depends largely on the precise u&
this coiultry expects to make of its strategic(air arm. The decision to slight.
&orti on active and passive defense is more likely to be sound if the Unitql)
States expect to use SAC strictly for deterring unlimited aggression by the
USSR. It is less likely to be sound if the United States freely employs the
threat of its nuclear airpower to deter Soviet Ruasia from limited-aggression'
p d walks $0 the brink of war with considqable frequency. Such resort to.
$AC's punch must to some extent increase &e probability of unlimited war
braking out, if only inadvertently. A strategy of relying so heavily on mat,
tegic airpower may warrant a, relatively smaller outlay on tactical surfam
forces designed for limited war, but it hardly ju&es the neglect of air
defense at tbe same time. Since to maintain strategic airpower i s a must, her?
is some Iogic in seeing air defense and a limited-war capacity a8 cornpetbe
claimpnts on defense resources; but the neglect of both, as the United States
has done in recent years, is hard to justify. .
There are further reasons for favoring an investment in a degree of a&
defii118e which is marginal yet a great deal more substantial than has been
attempted so far. A hardening of cidian targets by means of shelter p r y
&aip for reducing casualties at Lhe periphery of bomb bursts, Where heat &d
b U have spent most of their force, would involve expenditurea of
$10 to &I0 billion over a number of years, depending on tha degree of margiad protection desired. Such a program could not prevent huge casualties, but
it- might save as much as one-third or more of tbe population o t h d ,
doomed to death or injury. An effort in this direction wo$d be a partid
&Surance against the risk, however small it is hoped to be,.that un-I
war
break out. It would also assure the Kremlin that he United Stam
meana business and will not flinch in the face of Russian threats.
The question of how large a proportion of defense resources should be
ehannelkd into research and development for active air defepse Ekewise w;
not be considered senled in favor'of a relatively modest effort, At the ~ r d ,
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EXT TO the question of doctrine, the problem of allocations must oe

first rank. The problem is chiefly one of attitudes. One of these, complacency, has been underscored in recent months. Of the others, the most
important ones are the fear that an excessive allocation of resources to defense
will tmdermine the American economy; the gnawing doubt that the military
manage the resources allotted to them with cirsumspection and efficiency; and
finally, the public's reluctance to pay the tab. All of these attitudes come
seriously into play because defense costs in the modern age are inordinately
high.
The High Costs d Defense: Compared with previous periods of formal
pea&, recent American defense costs have been fluctuating at a very high
level. From 1930 to 1939, the United States spent a little over 1per cent of its
GNP on national security. Even in 1939, with war imminent, the share was
a little under 1.5 per cent. In contrast, the outlay on national security (including atomic energy and foreign military aid) averaged 6.5 per cent during the
four years from 1947 to 1950 and, following the extraordinary expenditures
in the Korean War, nearly 11 per cent during the three years from 19% t6
1956. Several factors account for this "quantum jump" :
and
The sharp rise in defense costs reflects in large part Soviet
the bipolar structure of world power which places the main Western military
burden on the United States. Old mainstays, such as the Royal Navy, no
longer serve to protect the s&urity of this country.
0 . Effective security now rests o v e ~ ~ h e l m i n
on~ lr&dy
~
strength rathet
'

+myas previously, on a war potential to be mobilized in time of emergency.
Whether it is for deterring all-out nuclear attack or repelling local aggression,
the need is for forces instantly on hand.
Technological progress has greatly raised the ski11 and hardware needs
of the armed forces. Planes are much more expensive to produce and maintain, crews are much more expensive to train than formerly, etc.
R
The extraordinary quickening in the pace of weapons development not:
only demands increasingly large resources for remarch and development; it
&o subjects expensive equipment, and the skill to use it, to an unprecedented
rate of obsolescence. To render existing weapons obsolete is the very purpose
of research and development, and the need for doing so is compelling if
soviet technological competition is to be met.
These four conditions alone have greatly revolutionized the nature of the
U.S. security problem. Yet there is still a fifth factor: the inescapable need to
cope with uncertainty. As was pointed out above, we are facing an unusual
technological uncertainty and, as w i l l be observed below, we are under the
pressure of economic uncertainty. Above all, there is strategic uncertaintythat is, there is no obvious answer to the question of which kind of military
posture the United States should favor. It is therefore desperately diflicult to
decide how much would best be spent on SAC, on limited-war capacity- and
of what kind, or on civilian and active air defense. Since there is a limit on
the total effort the United States is able and willing to make, the need to
choose is unavoidable: and any decision entails a large risk of being proven
faulty in the future. For example, future events might present us with frightful consequences if the United States.put defense resources overwhelmingly
into the strategic airforce and starved its ability to cope with limited wars by
limited means; if an overemphasis on civilian air defense came to impair
SAC, the consequences might be similarly calamitous. And even if the planners could be-sure of having made the right forecast in 1957, which they can
hardly be, they cannot hope that the forecast will stand in 1958 or 1959, for
the conditions of strength and weakness in the Soviet orbit and in the rest of
the world, and our knowledge of them, are incessantly in flux. Rather, efficiency demands a constant readiness to revise all choices in response to
changing circumstances.
The Problem of Choice: Nor doas this b d of uncertainty confound the
planner only on the level of general strategy. The problem of prediction and
choice appears on numerous levels throughout the military establishment.
How much more should we spend on increasing the mobility of our ground
forces? How many more aircraft carriers s h d d we construct, and how many
submarines capable of launching rockets? How many fighter and bombing
planes of any particular type should we manufacture at any one time, when
improved types are already on the drawing boards? What proportion of
ddense funds should be allocated to research; how much to basic- research,
how much to the improvement of weapons likely to be out-of-date t h ~ or
e
four years hence? How much should we spend on developing guided and
ballistic missiles as against manned aircraft? How much should be spent an
radar screens as against shelters, how much
stockpiles? The lid of'choioes

seems endlesa But all the choicerg mnst be exercised and, once made, q u e ~ r
t i o d and, if necessary, r e v w .
This f~rmidableprdpm of p ~ d i o nA d choice has tbree weighty
implications. First, m y of the ~hoiscrsto be made may have awfd co&am
may 8 e r i d y , or even &astxonsly, affect the future survival
of the nation. If we shift too large a preportion of our funds from plane and
missile production to reaearcb and devdop~ent,we may find ourselves at a
critical moment without enough s e n i d l e planes and mkiles-for prototypes cannot fight. If we economize excawively cm research and devebpmmt,
including basic research, we may discover some day that the Soviet Union
haa achieved a technological br-o~h
in a weapons system which renders our forces-in-being obsolete. If we are pareimonious about active and
civilian air defense, snd the Big Deterrent fails to deter, we may have c r u d
tba death of miUiom who might have survived. If H T ~economize ex-ively
on m o b i l e , d a c e and tactical air forces (including a large airlift capacity)
that are able to do combat in local wars, we m a y me C o d s t rule expand
by means of military blackmail or local warfare because we hesitate to un1 4 . an unlimited nudear war of mutual destruction.
Second, and to repeat, many of the fateful decisions are extremely hard to
make. Even our information -on current Soviet intentions and capabilities is
subject to marked error and, at the high level of policy-making, even firm .
estimates may be disregarded because their implications go against the graih
of established assumptions and preferences. But the allocative choices on
defense that we make today concern future contingencies, and our ability to
predict future situations in all relevant aqmcts is utterly inadequate. It &
certainly less dependable than officials of the Defense Department admit .when
they justify important decisions. To the kt-informed persaw, it must
inevitably appear that the probability of error is substantial and inescapable,
In short, the risk of making wrong decisions is as great as the consequences of
wrong decisions are perilous.
Third, throughout the military establishment, there is a lengthy lead time,
ohan stretching over several years, &re h i s i o n s on the developmat of
weapons or new fighting units yield nevr military power ready .for immediate
use. It took six years for the B-52to move from the drawiagboard stage to
that of combat readiness. It takes a long time from the initial decision to
man, equip and train an airborne division. This lengthy cycle in the production of modern military forces means that many errors in deciding on
the size, composition and equipment of the 'armed services cannot he
quickly retrieved.
The triple fact that, in making important decisions on defense, errors are
likely to be frequent, fateful -and (except over long time-spans) irrevocable
clearly underscores the need for prudence. The price of gambling is formidable. We dare not assume that we can predict ,with any degree of prmision
the size and kind of military defense which will give us any desired degree
of security in 1959 or 19M, and proceed to cut out forces, weapons and researoh programs which, according to the prediction, we will not need. In the
face of uncertainty, prudence requires that we insure against error, that we
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4. I:, .. K::,cIi Can the tconomy SI,., '7.
The Feat: With defense makink ,tecessdy huge claims on the nati-io
resources, it is not surprising that a further element of uncertainty has confounded American planning: Can the American economy stand so large a
strain year after year for a presumably indefinite period? The recent disposition to cut outlays on defense was given some urgency by Congressional hoe
tility to even a temporary breaching of the Federal debt limit, and by the
determination, especially strong through the first three quarters of 1957, to
reduce inflationary pressures. Yet the main economic concern has been rooted
in the profound fear that too large a defense budget will undermine the health
of the American economy. President Eisenhower and numerous other officials
have voiced this anxiety repeatedly.
Unfortunately, there are no ready answers to the pestion of how large a
burden of defense the economy can "stand" over a long period of time. Few
of the officials concerned ever trouble themselves even to define what they
mean by a "sound economy" or to explain in a meaningful way how a rise in
defense expenditures by a few billion dollars would subvert the economy. Nor
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through the political process. Ordinarily, this decision will touch on the fun&
tioning of the American economy under only one major circumstance, as long
as full employment prevails. Wanting both to have the cake and eat it too,
the public might wish to spend more on defense than it is currently willing to
pay by foregoing other uses of a corresponding portion of its income. In that
event, inflationary pressures may result If prolonged and severe, these will
obstruct the efficient operation of the economy and, by encouraging the use
of direct governmental controls over the private use of resources, disturb the
operation of the relatively free economic system.
Since the defeme effort now needed is of indefinite duration, sound policy
requires it to be put on a pay-as-you-go basis. It is for the Government to
gauge the spending level which the public is willing to accept. Should
this level fall appreciably short of what is required on military grounds, it is
for the nation's leadership to explain to the public why larger outlays must
not be shirked.
This leaves the problem of whether, or to what extent, a persistently large
defense effort will clog the sources of growth in the American economy.
Indubwly, this is a sigeificant problem, for the defense effort rests in large
part on the economy, and whatever the security burdens imposed on it, they
can be borne more easily if the GNP keeps rising rapidly and with some
steadiness. A $500 billion economy gives the United States more strength on
which to draw than a $400 billion economy.
Those who fear that defense outlays at recent levels do serious harm to the
economy suspect that the onerous tax load involved dulls the income incentives
behind hard and productive work, enterprise and investment, and diminishes
the ability as well as the willingness to save. The problem is one of the total
tax burden in relation to the national income and one of the specific tax structure on the basis of which revenues are collected.
Concerning the first problem, there is thus far no empirical evidence for the
fear that a. defense effort absorbing between 10 and 12 per cent of the GNP
will act as a perceptible drag on American economic growth. Ever since
defense outlays and taxes were lifted to very high levels at the time of the
Korean War, the economy has been blessed by satisfactory rates of saving,
investment and innovation. Such intensive studies as have been made of persons in high-income brackets, though not entirely conclusive, have revealed a
great deal of grumbling over high tax rates but, in the aggregate, only a negligible slackening of productive effort. Moreover, when taxes bear down on
the receivers of middle incomes, their aggregate response has apparently been
to increase effort in order to maintain fairly rigid expenditure patterns involving insurance, homes, education, vacations and durable consumers' goods.
It is, of course, conceivable that, regardless of the particular tax structure,
the total tax load could be raised to a level that would impair incentives and
diminish the ability to save Nobody, however, knows at what level these
harmful effects would become substantial. It is surely plausible that there is
no sharp breaking point--say, a specific pacentage of the national income
claimed by taxes-at which these dects would become suddenly important.
One would rather expect that, once generated, these effects would at first be
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,To conclude, it is mo& improbable that defense -ding
in the neighborhood of the current scale, between 9 and 12 per cant of ,the GNP, will ruin
the American emnomy. There is m e r.i& .but a risk d y gradually increw
kg, of a net damage to the forces of economic growth if t a x ~ swere raised
above this range; and this risk wuld be minimbed by adapting thg tar struebare to the promotion of growth. The current fear of this risk seems maggeratsd and shodd not stand in the way of some %crease in the def-

effort, provided this is clearly required on military grounds. Moreover, in the
event of need, some risk to the economy's functioning must be accepted as
preferable to inadequate security against eidernal aggression. At present, the
United States seems to be running a far greater and far more dangerous risk
of being insufficiently prepared for defense than of undermining its economy.

5. Managing the Defense Emmm*~rt
wo further considerations militate against making adequate provision for

T

defense. One is the deep-seated civilian suspicion that the military are
always asking for too much and that it is safe, therefore, to apply almost
automatically a sizable discount to their requests. But though this suspicion
should not be relinquished, it is not at all clear that it should inspire more
than prudent probini. The military cannot be relied upon to ask forAtoomuch
at all times. Furthermore, the organization of the Department of Defense has
greatly strengthened civilian leadership and responsibility; the Bureau of the
Budget plays an important part in checking budget requests; and the National
Security Council offers a further opportunity for examining requests. To be
sure, the effectiveness of these safeguards depends in no small measure on the
personalities occupying the key positions. To reduce this particular weakness,
and especially to make Congressional review more effective, there is much
to be said for presenting budget requests first of all in terms of military missions-strategic airpower, capacity for limited war, civilian defenseand
only secondarily in terms of the traditional breakdown by the three armed
services. This would show, to a greater extent than is the case now, just what
kind of military strength the proposed budget dollars are expected to buy.
Waste of Defense Dollars?: The other consideration follows from the
persistent feeling among civilians that the military are wasteful with defense
dollars and that a great deal more "defense worth" could be financed with
available or even Galler funds if only the management of the defense effort
were more efficient. To analyze the management performance of the military,
to trace its ways of spending funds on numerous administrative levels and
for numerous purpo&s, a n d t o suggest how present practices could be improved would be a task of formidable complexity, going clearly beyond the
scope of this brief survey. It would also require a body of knowledge so vast
and ditticult of access that few single individuals could manage it. The purpose
of the following remarks is more modest: to inquire into the nature of the
problem rather than to take up many specific instances of mismanagement
and reform.
Measured by some ideal standard of performance, or even by the actual
standards of &cient business corporati~ns,the management of-the defense
dollar is inefficient beyond doubt. Yet these criteria are of dubious relevance;
and to accept the fact that what looks like gross inefficiency by these standards
is not necessarily inefficiency in a military service, is probably the most important step toward sober appraisal. For example, a military inventory of
seemingly lavish supplies may, upon serious inquiry, turn out not to be lavish
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ia a ooqlfeated new weapon system, &d that they must approve-of all
~ ~ h i e:s
a@mltion
changes sabseqtaently pro@
by the private COB~ h d racebrmiwfor
,
a w d l y propo~onof &&timekpse. m
e remedy wodd
W f t o ' ! l i ein a method by which the &tary
would specify only esamtid
pedbhin the devebpadent phaae, an& h v e the oonhaiater free to
the materials, eornpnenb and techniques by which &ti h i r e d p e r f o m &
caa be achieved;
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. - Another prScLE;q,inneed of reform is the cost-raising tradition of the semi
icm-again undQstandable in terms of their aspiration to utmost dependab'il,a$..
mab6rieI-t~insist on equipment performance which, though very
--sive
at the margin, adds only slightly to dependability or vermtiIity in
@&at use. Where large expenditures add only little to military worth, they
ebould be fo~egone.By avoiding such "excessive specification," and also by
abandoning the pr&t
cost-plnefee contract-which gives the private fim
too-little incentive to cut costs-substantial savings might by achieved over
time.
. T h e contention knot that the above and similar remedies do not have drawbacks of &eiz 6m. M ~ r detailed
e
exploration is required before an &te
of get beadits'can be made with some confidenwi; and, however good a prop o d refom looks on' paper, its administration is sure to be difficult. There
*&reno easy answers to the problems of defense management. Yet in view of
tho grave issues at stake, this should not be allowed to discourage the searkh
for &betterafiangements.
Whatever the specificproblem, the central problem is, in any Case, that sure
and lasting improvement i n defense managemefit requires a fundamentally
new approach. First, any move toward such impro~ementmust begin with the
poEti081 and administrative realities of the world in which the military opera
at& The frustrations s u f f d by the military at the hand of C o n g r ~ e sSec,
retaries of Defense, and Presidents have caused the developmm1: of a set of
defensive attitudes which are the most critical roadblock onthe way to b&Ir
management. These attitudes cannot be decreed or legislated out of thi! way.
R&w, r e f d m should conkentrate initially on new management technique
Itoat likely to call. these attitudes into play and, by eschewing the meat-ax
approach henceforth, the coiurtty can encourage their gradual decline. Seethe search for improved w h i p , adapted to the defense establishment,
is far from easy. It will require patiace and imaginative innovation; and, id
large part at least, any initial m e y Should be carried out by joint teams of
civilian specialists imd military officer#. If this trim of the problem is corkect,
any real progress must inevitably be slow. Bht it would seem bettet to be
satisfied with slow and sure progress than to insist on the technique of t&e
sudden assault which, on the basis of the record, id highly unlikely to produce
net benefits.

present state of the American defense effort calls for a basic review;
if there is need for a clarification of overall strategy, or at least an efficient
way of dealing with uncertainty; if it is time for a broad-gauged investment
in scientific and technical training, for a tough-minded appreciation of what
the economy can stand, and for a realistic approach to the problem of military
management-there is yet one prerequisite of success ranking above all these.
This is a new political momentum and vision. And whether or not this momentum and vision will come forth is, of all the uncertainties with which the
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American defense effort seems to bristle, perhaps the least fathomable.
What is required is clear enough, and can be put in plain words. To do
enough for defense under present conditions demands from society a huge
diversion of efforts which its members, qaturally enough, prefer to devote to
the pursuit of private ends. It means less consumption and more work, less
freedom of self-direction and more attention to a part of reality which cannot
help but induce anxiety. In short, it means giving up a great deal of what is
worth defending in order to improve the chances of protecting the rest. What
is at issue, moreover, is not a temporary effort, to win a war or weather a
single crisis, but a sustained and, seen from the imperfect vantage point of
the present, an indefinite effort. And this effort must come forth without anyone being able to prove compellingly that so much, and no less, is indeed a
minimum for reasonable security; hence the temptation will always be there
to do less and hope for the best-a temptation, incidentally, which the Communist rulers will try to manipulate to their advantage.
There are pessimistic observers who doubt that democratic societies-and
especially societies so much given to the search for personal comfort and
security-are capable of rising to the challenge and bearing the strain indefinitely. These skeptics fear that the future is with the harsh regimes of the
Communist Bloc. But it cannot be said that the mettle of the Western nations
has as yet been tested. The general public in this country, and in the other
Western countries as well, is not aware of the general nature of the military
problem confronting them.
The crucial function is that of political leadership. The security of the West
may come to be in sorry straits if its leaders yield to the push and pull of a
public-only partly informed of and, by disposition, largely reluctant to face
the external danger-and accord to defense only what thought, energy and
treasure it can spare from its devotion to domestic politics. In such circumstances, Western leaders will not be permitted to demand the necessary sacrifices, and demand these on the basis of a strategy that must cope with uncertain knowledge.
The first prerequisite is for leaders of all kinds-no matter what party,
interest group and ideological affiliation-to give priority to the job of coming to grips with the Communist menace in all its forms-military, political,
technological and economic. And this new momentum among the leaders can
only spring from a new vision which, at this time of supreme crisis, sees
external danger and the various means to avert it-science, innovation, economic growth, political responsibility and moral commitment-as an integral
part of life. Such a vision, the second prerequisite, will give steadiness of purpose which will do away with the risky dependence on Pearl Harbors, Koreas
and sputniks for provoking purpose belatedly, with the inefficient cycle of
complacency and over-reaction, and with the inability to seize the initiative
instead of merely parrying the initiatives of the opponent. Only such a vision
will yield a military stature in keeping with the enormity of the danger.

